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Political sociology is a new science in South 
Africa; indeed it is true to say that the subject is 
almost completely neglected in the Republic, 
where political studies are still conditioned by 
historical, legal and philosophical attitudes.' 
Teaching and writing and thinking in political 
science is still beset with discussions about 
"sovereignty”, "parliamentary supremacy", and 
“philosophy of law", as may be instanced in the 
debate over the disenfranchisement of the Cape 
Coloureds in 1951
To those who see political science as a living 
subject, closely related to sociology, psychology 
and economics, this is a sad state of affairs, for 
there are very many other rich fields of political 
investigation in South Africa. Empirical analysis of 
political data in the Republic of South Africa could 
yield many fruitful results, not only for the political 
sociologist, but also for the serious student of 
affairs who seeks to understand some of the 
motivations in one of the most ebullient of modern 
political situations.
“Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner", may 
not quite apply in the South African situation, but 
at least, some need is felt to escape from the 
perennial and frequently arid discussions about 
ideology whether emanating from circles close to, 
or opposed to, the government.3 An  understand­
ing of political forces should precede any final, or 
indeed, interim judgment. There is considerable 
need to elucidate the ingredients of the South 
African political formula, to consider problems 
like those of access and group politics.*
Any survey of political behaviour in South 
Africa, ought to begin with a consideration of the 
role of pressure groups or interest groups. The 
term “interest group" is to be preferred to "pres­
sure group" because the latter has tended, inter 
alia, to become a term of abuse, consequently 
losing some of its scientific potency.5 Once the 
interest group analysis has been made, it then 
becomes possible to judge the party system, and, 
finally, the reaction of global governmental 
authority to the various pressures.
There is no account of the origin of interest 
groups in South Africa, indeed there js little upon 
that aspect of behaviour at all.6 What is perhaps 
one of the earliest examples of interest group 
activity in Natal is given in the Natal Guide. A  
group of so-called businessmen set themselves up 
in opposition to the proposed introduction of 
customs duties designed to protect colonial 
industries in 1867.7 None the less, the duties were 
imposed. Pressure, however, continued and in the 
year 1884, the victory went to the interest group. 
The report for the year modestly adds that the Bill 
v/as ultimately withdrawn.8 Here a pressure group 
had acted like a “fire brigade", putting out a fire 
which had already started.
If we scan through the pages of South African 
history, we can observe the growth of pressures 
on, firstly, the colonial government and, secondly, 
the Union government. A s  the wealth of South 
Africa became to be revealed, so interests were 
created which sought, from time to time, to obtain 
concessions from the various governments of the
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day. The missionaries, the gold miners, the dia­
mond producers, the wine, sugar, wool, wattle 
manufacturers and, later, the industrialists, all 
these have striven to gain the ear of the govern­
ment. We are, however, less interested in the 
history of groups but rather more in their impact on 
modern South African government, particularly 
under a Nationalist government, now in its second 
decade of power. Yet, before studying the charac­
teristics of interest groups as these obtain in the 
South African scene, it is worth defining interest 
groups in general terms. An  interest group con­
sists of persons of like-mind, who, while refusing 
to accept direct responsibility for government, will 
yet make claims upon government for concessions 
which rebound to their own benefit.’ South African 
interest groups appear to have certain general 
characteristics which must first be considered in 
order to understand the peculiarities of the South 
African scene. In the first place, some types of 
interest groups are inoperative, restricted, or even 
forbidden. There is no existence for them, let 
alone a question of access. The position of trade 
unions is noteworthy in this context. Trade unions 
require by law to be registered. Employment itself 
is subject to restrictive legislation, such as that 
passed in 1956 reserving certain trades for white 
persons alone.10 The policy of job reservation has, 
however, produced a new set of pressures amongst 
those who consider the policy to be indefensible.11 
From the standpoint of 1965, it would appear that 
the policy of job reservation would become in­
creasingly subject to these pressures. In the 
second place, some interest groups are (con­
sciously or unconsciously), influential at the 
highest levels in the land. In South Africa these 
are the Dutch Reformed Church and its subordin­
ate committees as well as organisations like the 
Broederbond— a confidential inner group— de­
voted to the Afrikanerisation of South African 
society. At the time of writing, an investigation 
under the single scrutiny of Mr. Justice Botha, had 
revealed no subversive threat from such “secret 
societies" as the Broederbond, Sons of England, 
and the Free Masons. The clue to the understand­
ing of organisations like the Broederbond is not 
the ethical issue of whether inner groups should or 
should not operate at the very centre of power, but 
whether these, consciously (rather than uncon­
sciously), stimulate certain types of activity of 
purely governmental nature.12 There are, of
course, few governmental regimes in which the 
majority's party machinery has not captured the 
machinery of central government. Further, most 
political parties depend upon an inner "ethos" 
which serves as a cohesive force. Norms must 
inevitably be established which, independent of 
any formal machinery or constitution, serve as a 
set of rules of conduct acceptable to all members. 
The influence of Eton upon British Cabinets is 
notorious.13 Other similar influences in other 
countries may be mentioned. The American 
"New Frontier" of Kennedy was frequently 
attacked as being composed of Harvard professors, 
while de Gaulle has not unnaturally chosen sym­
pathisers of a politique de grandeur to advise and 
surround him. Michels apart, from Venice to 
Viet-nam an oligarchy has traditionally held sway 
over the minds and actions of the many.14 The 
Broederbond (as a pressure group) might really 
be a "philosophical society" as these were under­
stood in the eighteenth century. Such societies, 
have, at certain periods, exercised an important 
influence upon the leadership of political parties. 
The best example of this is perhaps to be found in 
the French Radical Party in which the influence of 
free masonry in the period 1900-1910 and later was 
very widespread.15 The Broederbond is effective 
because it presents a picture of a closely inte­
grated group of about 6,700 self-perpetuating 
oligarchs, operating through local divisions. The 
words of Duverger relating to the interplay of 
ideology and institution, mason and French 
Third Republic may be useful to throw light on the 
Broederbond. "It is undeniable that at that time, 
Masons formed the leading strata of the party, that 
Freemasonry provided the party with its frame­
work, its unity and its general lines of policy; that 
its influence was dominant in the Party Con­
gresses, in its Executive Committees, and over its 
leaders; and that, thanks to Freemasonry, the 
party acquired an effectiveness and a power such 
as it has never since recovered."'6
Such a situation cannot be unexpected; indeed, 
the social psychologist might welcome any form 
of group cohesion. Those who accept the group 
theory of politics must applaud those forces which 
bind the group rather than those which serve to 
split it, for if the group constitutes the normal 
mode of activity, one must welcome coherence 
rather than division. A  difficulty arises, however, 
with a change of government. Given a particular
10
party ethos a change in government results in a 
change in ethos— and this may frequently be a 
disturbing factor. A  removal of the Nationalist 
party from power might easily result in a loss of 
purpose, until the new party established and 
sustained its inner contacts. In Britain, however, 
the public school ethos in the Civil Service, army 
and public service generally and even in the upper 
managerial strata of private industry provides a 
continuity of outlook which even the advent of 
labour party rule does not impair. The Public 
schools are still the most influential norm-bearers 
in British society, and their Old Boys dominate the 
upper ranks of the Church, the Bench, the City, 
the Foreign Service, and the Cabinet. Thus is 
created the Establishment, defined by Christopher 
Hollis as “a body of people acting, consciously or 
unconsciously, together, holding no official posts 
through which they exercise their power, but 
nevertheless exercising a great influence on 
national policy." In the third place, interest groups 
in South Africa have tended to be grouped accord­
ing to race. This is not surprising, bearing in 
mind the nature of South African society. People 
see the grouping in different ways. There are those 
who would insist on a rigid grouping according to 
race, in hospitals for instance, but there are those 
whose object is to break down barriers— associa­
tions and clubs within churches for example.'7 
These latter, however, might be described as 
groups promoted “from above". Yet it is signifi­
cant that even those groups who originate “from 
below" resolve themselve into racial categories. 
The blind, for example, will be organised as the 
Bantu blind, teachers' associations will be, for 
example, Indian Teachers’ Societies, and the 
handicapped will be Jewish Handicapped. Of 
course, it can be argued that the categories per­
mitted are already provided, as it were, by nature. 
Even political systems must reflect social facts.
In some cases, however, it may be a question of 
the hen and the egg. Would the group voluntarily 
develop outside the permitted categories in the 
absence of a firm government directive on the 
matter? Some indeed must so develop— for 
example, the animals of all races must necessarily 
be the concern of the S.P.C.A. Yet what of a 
motoring organisation such as the A.A. which has 
a restrictive entry clause based on race?
In this case, protection of the white motorist is 
prior to protection of the motorist. So  it would
appear that South African interest groups are self­
generating normally within the racial context. The 
fourth characteristic of South African interest 
groups is that they have peculiar problems of 
leadership. Leaders of South African society are 
produced roughly as they are in Britain, that is to 
say, according to the principles of an “Establish­
ment" rather than a "Power Elite".18 The latter 
according to C. Wright Mills, constitutes an 
“elite in irresponsible command of unprecedented 
means of power and manipulation", and the sug­
gestion is that such an elite is devoid of traditional 
ethics and values which may, at times, transcend 
more monetary rewards. South African elites do 
frequently place traditional ethics and values above 
the mere pursuit of power. South African myths are 
as pervading as anywhere in the young countries 
of the world. Moreover, as White South African 
society is a society more on the defensive than 
almost any other society in the world today—  
hence its leadership problems are that much more 
acute. Each of the two white groups subscribes to 
a psychological attitude peculiarly its own, so that 
decisions are not the result of the pressures and 
counter pressures which take place between all the 
forces existing in society. Afrikaner and Briton are 
separate sociological groups, and at the top of 
these groups operate respectively, the Broeder- 
bond, and the mores of the public school. Just as 
the Clarendon public schools in England set the 
tone for English society, so do the South African 
equivalents for English-speaking South African 
society. Yet, as R. M. Mciver pointed out, “The 
power a man has is the power he disposes; it is 
not intrinsically his own. He cannot command 
unless another obeys."70 Obedience is given to 
both these sets of leaders in Afrikaner and 
"British” society, though more particularly to the 
former. Hence, the concept of leadership in South 
Africa is fundamentally different from that which 
obtains in the U.S.A. where, it is confidentially 
said: “No single trait or group of characteristics 
has been isolated which sets off the leader from 
the members of his group." Moreover, in South 
Africa, it does not appear to be true that leadership 
is a purely “functional relationship which rules out 
the possibility that all leaders have in common cer­
tain ‘traits' that set them off from the followers."71 
In the U.S.A. where this is true according to social 
psychologists, it is further possible to say that, 
"Leadership is not a quality which a man pos-
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sesses, it is an interactional function of the 
personality and of the social situation,”’1 In a 
British-type society as is English-speaking white 
South Africa, leadership is a function of status. 
There are the pseudo-Ciarendon type public 
schools at the lower academic levels, though no 
such hierarchy compares with Oxbridge at the 
university level.
A  final point of importance is that South African 
interest groups are, a priori, likely to be less 
successful in their endeavours than are those in 
most Western European countries. To put this in 
another way, the counter-pressures, from above, 
will be such that an interest group in South Africa 
will find itself faced by special difficulties created 
by strong or authoritarian government. South 
African interest groups need not expect to find 
warmhearted government reaction to their efforts, 
unless the efforts of the group harmonise with the 
policies of the Cabinet. Where the pleas of interest 
groups for concessions elsewhere are met with 
sympathy, South African ministers take collective 
responsibility seriously in that they do not 
countenance any group purely on its own merits. 
The group conflict is not, in South Africa, a 
natural process. A  bellum omnium contra omnium 
does not apply precisely, because order has 
already been imposed upon (or accepted) by the 
group state of nature.
One important question relates to the relation­
ship between the external influence of a country 
and its ability to contain interest groups. Certain 
countries which attempt to cut a figure In world 
politics may be unable to contain internal pres­
sures, as the case of France under the Fifth 
Republic amply shows.”  These pressures are 
primarily economic, and may usually properly be 
regarded as a sinister influence (just as Rousseau 
regarded "partial wills”). Before 1939, economic 
pressure groups were normally regarded as 
something sinister in the West. It is interesting to 
see that since the war, such groups (including 
trade unions), have tended to be regarded as more 
respectable hitherto. If they do exist, they are 
usually exhorted merely to refrain from "restrictive 
practices"— one of the key terms in political dis­
cussions in the past decade.
More recently, it would appear that social 
pressure groups (e.g. the "Establishment”), have 
been regarded as more significant by students of 
the subject. In South Africa, interest groups
appear, on the whole, to be contained to an extent 
unthinkable in France.
In setting out the interest groups themselves, 
recourse must be had to some conceptual frame­
work. None has been formulated with regard to 
South Africa, indeed, many even of the discussions 
of theory in America and Europe have yielded little 
besides booklists of theories.”
Without wishing to enter into the arguments 
about theory— whether interest groups are some­
thing different from pressure groups, whether 
categoric groups are non-political, whether the 
term "Lobby" is a more accurate term than 
"pressure groups", or any other groups— it is 
proposed to analyse a few interest groups without 
any overall attempt to reduce the analysis to a 
preconceived pattern, though following Finer and 
Blondel, a distinction will be made between what 
are called “promotional" and "protectional" 
interest groups.
Promotional groups seek to appeal to the broad 
mass of the population, because they have a 
"cause", most frequently philanthropic or "moral", 
as Finer says of them, they are, "the societies for 
improving this and pulling down that". Protective 
interest groups have the task of assisting members 
of an association or organisation to improve their 
material advantages, or, at least, not to suffer 
diminution in these.
South Africa contains examples of both varieties 
of group, but because of the racial divisions 
within the country, it is difficult in fact for promo­
tional groups to make a generalised appeal as 
might be the case in a relatively more homogeneous 
population. Protective interest groups are, conse­
quently, more active, as they must be to protect 
interests in a country whose tendencies towards 
division have been more marked than the ten­
dencies towards unity. Yet, irrespective of such 
divergency, in almost any situation, there will be 
divided opinion regarding means, if not ends. 
Choosing at random any issue, this might seem to 
be the case. For example, building a railway line 
must inevitably involve clashes of interest based on 
mere economic interest alone which become 
inevitably more acute if the problems of race are 
encountered with regard to service or labour. The 
position was well put in a debate held in the House 
as Assembly on 27th May, 1963, when the United 
Party Member of Parliament for Simonstown (Mr. 
L. C. Gay) declared (of a proposed railway venture,)
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“in a job of this magnitude, there are naturally 
many different interests at stake, interests which 
do not always see eye-to-eye"26 Economic and 
racial interests abound.
Interests do not have to be created, as it were, 
in South Africa, they exist a priori. Nevertheless, 
the pattern of powerful interest groups in the 
economic field so much in evidence in Britain and 
in the United States continues to dominate the 
South African scene. There is a geographical 
variation in the disposition of the groups in the 
Republic— thus the K.W.V. (Co-operative Wine­
growers Association of South Africa Limited), 
and the various wine interests are relatively more 
active in the Cape Province than is the South 
Africa Sugar Association and the attendant 
sugar interest whose activities are centred more in 
Natal. It is proposed, therefore, to analyse protec­
tive interest groups, industry by industry, in order 
to assess the extent of their operations in so far 
as these are pertinent to political science. Before 
this is done, however, it is worth asking what sort 
of picture of the South African political scene 
might be expected to emerge. A  study of the 
activities of the various groups might be expected 
to produce a picture of Hobbesian conflict, group 
against group, all involved in a vicious competition 
for power. Life becomes, in Finer’s words, “a 
rubber-stamping of compromise from the push 
and pull of a swarm of competing groups", were it 
not for the compensating factors of constitutional 
democracy.27
The instinctive reaction of the observer of the 
political scene in South Africa is to embark upon 
an examination of ideology. The concept of 
apartheid has become something of an invitation 
to a slanging match, an ideological shibboleth and 
this at a time when, as Lipset puts it, "serious 
intellectual conflicts between groups representing 
different values have declined sharply.”28 What 
remains in the West are myths rather than pro­
found ideological clashes. “Interests" then, domi­
nate politics, at least as much as ideas, as Home 
suggested nearly two hundred years ago. In a 
classic study, Thibaudet had warned however, 
"No hope for a party which writes on its banner 
'interests'. If this is so, then it is reasonable to look 
at South Africa as a nation which is an exception 
to the general Western trend. “Ideas" are still 
as important as “interests", and the idea of 
apartheid would appear to dominate the scene to
the exclusion of all else. Values still appear to fly 
in the face of facts. The Afrikaner clings to his 
vision of a society of White Christian nationalism, 
steadfast and unchanging— dogmatic and un­
yielding.
Political theory in South Africa can spurn 
sociological evidence. The moral beliefs of the 
Afrikaner are impervious to such evidence “not 
because their proponents do not adduce any in 
support of their position, but because the con­
clusions argued from the evidence rest upon an 
interpretation which, if consistently maintained, 
can be guaranteed in advance to cover any fact 
which the observer might bring back from the 
sociological study of the contingent world.”29 We 
may, of course, succeed in controverting such 
people on grounds of consistency (this has been 
done time and time again— apartheid can be 
shown not to be working— the influx of Africans 
to the towns is an unreversable process). Yet 
political beliefs are, as Runciman points out, not 
amenable “to the adducing of logical or empirical 
evidence". Political argument in South Africa, 
therefore, frequently consists in an exchange of 
boos and hurrahs. Thus those in the Nationalist 
Party who cry “save the state” are accused by 
their enemies of having shouted "destroy the 
state" before 1948 when the Nationalists came to 
power.
In understanding the clash between different 
interests as part of the pattern of normal political 
activity, one needs to consider some other 
questions.
Is there firstly an interest of the nation— which 
all groups might agree to uphold? Is it universally 
and invariably held, standing apart from and 
superior to those interests of the various groups 
included? Will people be content, once they 
understand, rationally, what is involved, to take 
what a "given" political situation offers them? Is 
it possible to find the highest common factor of 
all the different lobbies in South Africa, the wine 
“lobby", the sugar “lobby", the gold “lobby", the 
mines interests, the A.A., the S.P.C.A., not to 
mention a host of other groups.
The cancellation of the plusses and the minuses 
might not result in a basic balance or harmony, 
what Finer calls the “Benthamite" solution. 
Cohesion depends then on the basic attachment 
to the nation, more particularly to the South 
African nation, so that the Benthamite solution is
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not particularly appropriate to the condition of 
South Africa, it is rather the notion of Rousseau 
that there is a "higher law" than that of merely 
adding together the selfish interests of competing 
groups. The addition of such groups would not in 
itself produce a body politic. It is the search for 
something greater than the mere synthesis of con­
flicting components which bedevils South Africa 
today. Bantu, Boer, and Briton or Indian, these are 
the basic ingredients within which groups develop 
and over whose strictly ethnical lives they fre­
quently stray. Superimposed over the question of 
“what is the state” is the secondary question of 
“what is the nation”, it was Rousseau who saw in 
the nation the salvation for the disunity and dis­
loyalty of mere sectional interests. The "human 
atom" could directly understand the call of the 
nation whereas he despaired that mere aggregates 
could ever claim separate moral validity. The 
South African politician makes frequent references 
to “our nation", "our country", “the volk", as the 
fundamental authority to which all individuals must 
and will render allegiance. For White South 
Africans this is a call which transcends all other 
divisions, so that they can quite unselfconsciously, 
defend their country from external attacks, verbal 
or otherwise, in spite of their antipathy to govern­
ment politics.
Most interest groups are eager to point out that 
they are, what they call, “non-political". In this 
case, it would appear prima facie, that the interest 
group analysis would not belong to political 
science because the interests themselves disclaim 
any connection with the political process— recently 
the South African Chamber of Industries declared 
itself to be “non-political” as well as the Chambers 
of Commerce and the Institute of Race Relations.
in fact, groups desire to remain innocent of the 
political taint, but their interpretation of political is 
particularly restrictive. They might rightly claim 
that they are not party partisan, in the sense that 
they support or finance a particular political party 
for its own sake. A  Bottle Store Association does 
not a priori support, for example, the United 
Party. Certainly some groups clearly see their 
salvation in supporting particular parties— parti­
cularly in the Afrikaans sector of South African 
society. “Non-political" can only mean that an 
interest group does not wish to leave the shadows 
of pressure-grouping and enter into the sunshine 
of the party arena. All interest groups want to gain
as much influence in the legislature as they can, 
which involves the placating, rather than the 
non-alienation, of the major parties. Thus they 
will not align themselves permanently with one 
party as against another. When this happens and 
such a permanent alliance is effected, then an 
interest group has become a mere party affiliate. 
Hence, interest groups must carry on political 
flirtations on the largest possible scale, or remain 
aloof from the whole exercise. The alternative to 
loose living is complete celibacy. A  permanent 
liaison can only lead to a loss of identity. No 
interest group wishes to nullify its efforts hence, 
to use the somewhat picturesque words of Finer 
once again, . . . “All that ‘non-political' means in 
such a context is that an organisation reserves the 
right to look a gift horse in the mouth and bite the 
hand of the party that feeds it."31
In South Africa groups are more interested in 
“government” than in party politics. It is within the 
governmental process that the interest group can 
most effectively operate. In discussions and 
deliberations with ministers, one does not face 
the open glare of publicity and polemics over 
principles; rather one depends upon gentlemen's 
agreement, adjustment, compromise and the 
avoidance of acrimonious controversy.
Government in the abstract is a "neutral", a set 
of practices and institutions within whose frame­
work “politicians" operate. Its characteristics are 
anonymity, complexity, elementally and, fre­
quently, delay, the time-curing tranquilliser of 
bitter conflicts.
Government, the constitutional apparatus of the 
State, is an impartial arbiter, an administrative 
mechanism which mediates interests by imple­
menting the demands of various pressure groups. 
This does not imply that even in general terms 
government is totally unresponsive to group 
activity. Indeed it has recently been argued that 
"it is impartial among a limited number of con­
testants in a limited conflict between the precise 
application of a general rule, principle, or policy. 
Apart from such cases, a government would be 
regarded as totally unresponsive if it were "im­
partial”.33
While it is true that, in South Africa, even the 
machinery of government is responsive to its 
environment in a high degree, it is none-the-less 
passive in comparison with group activity. It 
would not, therefore, be correct to see South
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Africa as, for example, D. Truman sees the 
government of the U.S.A. or as <J. D. Stewart sees 
the government of Great Britain as mere adminis­
trative bodies which mediate between interest 
groups by implementing their various demands 
wherever possible. The South African minister is 
very well aware of the ethos which he would wish 
to see established in the Republic.
His image will be that of the Afrikaner National 
party defended in Parliament as well as outside 
with complete devotion as the pages of Hansard 
testify.
In his everyday dealings, therefore, even in 
purely administrative affairs, the minister of State 
is responsible in terms of the Afrikaner Wettan- 
schaung. None the less, even he, for much of his 
time is a passive instrument of policy which 
interest groups will try to manipulate to their own 
ends. Many complaints will be noted, in the pages 
which follow, from ministers who feel themselves 
hounded by one form of pressure after another.
To the student of interest groups there is much 
to discover in the operations of these social 
pressures. In South Africa, as everywhere else, 
interest groups are capable of exerting consider­
able power through their constant campaigns at 
the weak spots of the government machine. Yet 
in South Africa too, the government can frequently 
exert counter pressure. There are possibly two 
special reasons for this. In the first place, the 
central government in South Africa possesses a 
remarkable degree of cohesion unusual even in a 
system where collective ministerial responsibility 
normally exists. It is conceivable that external 
pressures assist or have even produced the high 
degree of cabinet solidarity typical of most of the 
last two decades of South African history. The 
motto or device of South Africa (seen on all coins), 
is Eendrag maak mag (Unity is Strength).
In constitutional terms, South Africa's unity is 
produced by the parliamentary system, by the 
convention that "winner takes all", the leader of 
the majority party becoming Prime Minister and 
the party, the guardians of government and state. 
Hence, while there is a two-party system operating 
in the Republic, the majority party holds firm 
control over the machinery of the state as it must 
do in a parliamentary type system.33 It might be 
said, however, that there is no sign of the elector­
ate's wishing to transfer its allegiance to the major
Opposition party (particularly bearing in mind the 
change in the electoral representation in the 
Transvaal).
Further, the South African constitutional system 
appears to be developing a state of mind known to 
the early Boers as the “laager mentality"— the 
spirit of union and defiance reminiscent of the 
old dangerous days when the Boers contrived to 
defend lives, homes, property and families against 
all enemies. The combination of this laager 
mentality (which is Boer) and the principle of 
collective responsibility (which is British) is a 
unique mixture of the earthy and the sophisticated 
which greatly assists governmental cohesion.
The second reason why government in South 
Africa is able to withstand external social pres­
sures derives from the structure of government 
itself. The South African governmental system, 
like the British, has relatively few points of access.33 
Indeed, it may be asserted that, the minister of the 
state is the unique point of access. The pre­
eminence of the minister's position is explained in 
two ways: in the first place, South Africa is a 
unitary and notafederal state (despite all evidences 
to the contrary), and there are no subordinate 
federal units with sovereign powers in duly 
specified areas of activity, as there are, for example, 
in the U.S.A. In the second place, there are only 
seventeen cabinet ministers (as of early 1965) 
excluding the Prime Minister, many of whom hold 
an amazing array of portfolios.35 One deputy 
minister might be responsible (in a deputy capa­
city) for four "deputy” portfolios.36 This reduces 
the points of access still further, so that when a 
Minister says "no", much discussion is perforce 
terminated which might otherwise have con­
tinued for some time.
What caps the whole structure is a remarkable 
general homogeneity of outlook which persists 
from the dedicated National party worker at the 
bottom to the topmost levels of the Cabinet. 
Backbench revolts are rare if not non-existent. In 
short, what obtains in the party-government 
structure in the Republic of South Africa is a 
nearly complete ideological consensus. In conse­
quence of this, the government is able to present 
a united front to the world at large outside. Hence 
any study of interest groups in South Africa will 
have to record many struggles and many failures 
and only a few victories.
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Some Aspects of South African Interest Groups
Protective groups indeed dominate the scene in 
South Africa. The Chamber of Mines, for example, 
has been described as “one of the great influences 
in South Africa".37 The concessions which such 
an interest group can obtain from the government 
may be gauged from the fact that the Chamber of 
Mines has obtained for itself the particular privilege 
of special access (a concept beloved by political 
sociologists), to the parliamentary lobby in Cape 
Town, so that it may lobby Ministers at any time. 
This is a privilege which it shares with the Chamber 
of Industries, the Afrikaansesakekamer and the 
Afrikaansehandelsinstituut. Lobbying, is of course, 
a basic right which exists in a parliamentary type of 
government, but large and powerful interests 
frequently make full use of it. No doubt this was in 
President Truman's mind when he made his 
famous, if somewhat question-begging comment, 
“. . . we must get politics out of the hands of 
pressure groups and into the hands of the people".
The clue to understanding what passes for much 
of the political activity in South Africa, lies in 
knowing that neither pressure groups nor people 
are in control. South African Ministers have 
trained themselves to turn a deaf ear to the pleas 
which come from many quarters. Sport is an 
important case in point.3® South Africans are great 
lovers of sport, but the policy of apartheid in sport 
in South Africa itself, has not been modified, in 
spite of moves by the Government, in mid-1967, 
to relax certain stringent rules about racial mixing 
in competitive sport outside the country.
Another example consists of television, which 
has for long been prohibited in the Republic. The 
campaign to introduce television has been intri­
guing, in all senses of the word. For a variety of 
reasons, ideological, economic, and social, the 
South African government has been implacably 
opposed to the introduction of television, in spite 
of the fact that 81 countries in the world now 
possess this particular means of communication.3’ 
There are technical reasons why television should 
have not yet been introduced into South Africa, 
for example, the important consideration that the 
centres of largest population concentrations are 
widely dispersed.40 Yet one who studies the state­
ments put out by the various Ministers, both in the 
House and outside, must come to the conclusion 
that television is withheld from the South African
public for ideological reasons. Television is 
regarded with grave suspicion by the leaders of 
Afrikaner thought and opinion. It is seen as a 
purveyor of a way of life inimical to Afrikanerdom.
The observer from Britain or America must be 
amazed at the quiescent nature of the South 
African public with regard to television, or the lack 
of it, in the Republic. There is no public clamourfor 
television, there is no campaign mounted for its 
imminent introduction, there is no “lobby”.41 In 
truth, the campaign of the South African govern­
ment against television is stronger than the 
campaign for its introduction. From time to time 
the question of the introduction of television into 
the Republic has been raised in Parliament. A  
thorough discussion took place during a debate 
on 27th April, 1964.42 The Prime Minister, Dr. 
Verwoerd, found himself involved in heated 
exchanges with the Leader of the Opposition, Sir 
de Villiers Graaff. The Opposition had intimated 
that the Government wished to protect the Afri­
kaans press (in which the Prime Minister was a 
commanding influence), by opposing the intro­
duction of television.
Dr. Verwoerd announced that "it would be the 
easiest thing in the world for us to use television 
to enrich our undertakings”. Yet he emphatically 
denied that such a thought had ever sullied the 
philosophy of the National Party. The Minister of 
Posts and Telegraphs, Dr. Albert Hertzog, whose 
right-wing tendencies had attracted considerable 
comment, and who set himself up against tele­
vision on grounds of principle, pointed to the 
deleterious effects of television upon young 
persons.43 Reference was made to various studies 
which “proved" his contention. Others, less prone 
to rely on more academic viewpoints, saw tele­
vision as a Trojan Horse, bringing highly undesir­
able influences into the country. The member for 
Pretoria East, Dr. J. C. Otto, felt that, when tele­
vision was introduced, "we shall find communists 
and liberalists sneaking in”. He went on to say 
that, “we dare not sell our national soul and that 
at the high cost of the introduction and mainte­
nance of television".44 These arguments were, 
however, a useful smokescreen for those who had 
most to gain from the prohibition of television, 
among which may be numbered drive-in cinemas 
and cinemas generally. It was clearly to their
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advantage that the Minister repeated, up to 1965, 
that television was a "permanent non-starter".
The television debate in South Africa, in fact, 
can tell us a great deal about the nature of the 
governmental process. A  stand may be freely and 
frequently made on the grounds of principle.
All types of groups, in so far as they exist to 
exert pressure upon the political process, are of 
concern to the student of political science. While 
promotional groups are largely inhibited by race 
legislation regarding “mixed gatherings", it is 
clear that there is no shortage of protective 
interest groups. Yet even Afrikaner groups are not 
necessarily able to influence government thinking 
on any and every issue as the cause of the gamb­
ling lobby has shown.45
Among the more powerful protective groups 
in the Republic are those connected with the 
alcohol and hotels lobby. Research shows a vast 
and intricate network of interests and sub-interests 
operating in the Cape in the orbit of the grape.44 
The major interest within the alcohol lobby are the 
Cooperative Winegrowers’ Association (K.W.V.) 
situated at Paarl, and the various brewers' interests 
(with the ubiquitous Dr. Rupert in the latest ven­
ture, that of introducing Whitbreads into the 
Republic).
Interests operate on the side of alcohol produc­
tion which seek the ear of government, but there 
are extremely tenacious interests on the side of 
distribution also. The bottle stores and the general 
liquor distributors have ferociously defended their 
rights to share in the lucrative trade in alcohol. All 
potential rivals in the distributive field have been 
very severely attacked as the interlopers which 
they undoubtedly were. There is a delicate balance 
of interest between the forces of production and of 
distribution, as may be evidenced from the re­
marks of the-then Minister of Justice (Mr. B. J. 
Vorster), during the debate on the Liquor Amend­
ment Bill, on 10th June, 1963.
The Minister said: “The moment one comes 
forward with such a liquor Bill there are so many 
conflicting interests which one has to reconcile 
with one another, conflicting interests which very 
often do not even want the sun to shine on the 
others".47 He discounted the view that the Govern­
ment was the tool of the wine farmers of South 
Africa.4* He went on to castigate “certain liquor 
interests", in particular, the Bottle Store Owners’ 
Association, for their methods, including the use
of circulars, allegedly to misrepresent the Govern­
ment’s case.
A s  the debate proceeded, various other interests 
were revealed, inter alia, the hotels, the catering 
trade, temperance societies, church interests, 
breweries, bankers, and industrialists of all sorts. 
Certain promotional groups, in particular the 
temperance societies, showed themselves just as 
eager to press the Minister to their way of thinking 
as did the more obvious protective groups.49 One 
especially interesting alliance is that established 
between the Dutch Reformed Church and the 
South African Temperance Alliance which proved 
to be embarrassing to the government.50
A  South African interest group of the highest 
importance is the railway interest. Giving employ­
ment as it does to 22,000 workers, it is, in fact, an 
enormous monopsonist. Yet to question the 
efficiency of the South African railways is regarded 
as an unpatriotic act. Such critics are roundly 
condemned in Parliament and are shown for what 
they are. Many M.P’s. of course, have railwaymen 
as voters and they sometimes frame their speeches 
with that fact in mind.
The railway interest groups were described in 
one Sunday newspaper as a "state within a state", 
and as the "railway empire”. The railways in South 
Africa clearly have the ear of government, they are, 
indeed, constitutionally entrenched, and the 
General Manager is one of the two public servants 
in South Africa who cannot be retired, except by 
Resolution of Parliament.51
Opposed to the railway interest is the Road 
Federation itself, the protective organ of the road, 
interests, the Federated Chambers of Commerce 
(in so far as this was free to express an opinion), 
and those parts of business which are sympathetic 
to the roads case. There are many facets to this 
conflict, economic, social, and political, but the 
fundamental issue was seen as being "freedom" 
(represented by the roads), as against "mono­
poly", represented by the railways. The railways 
have resorted to many different types of tactics in 
order to ensure the maximum number of difficulties 
for road competitors. Lobbying over the road-rail 
controversy took on the nature of a crusade, as 
the railways interests pleaded “national interest" 
and depicted the roads group as “un-South 
African".
The railways have had the ear of government for 
a long time, but the margarine lobby has not been
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so fortunate.32 In the case of the conflict between 
margarine and butter, the margarine interests 
have been singularly unsuccessful. According to 
an Act passed in 1918, the sale of margarine con­
taining any milk, fat, or colouring matter is pro­
hibited.52 Hence the butter producers, the South 
African Dairy Industry Control Board, have 
successfully managed to frustrate much potential 
competition from margarine manufacturers.”  The 
Dairy Control Board may be regarded as the voice 
of the Dairy lobby, and one which has won a 
successful battle against the encroachments of 
margarine. In this context of South Africa, it is 
perhaps worth remarking that something “co­
loured" should make headway as against some­
thing "white".
There is another interest in the Republic which 
found itself embarrassed in 1966. In late 1964, the 
Parity Insurance Company went into liquidation 
and many motorists found themselves to be lack­
ing the legal requirement to be covered against 
“third party" claims. The Government brought out 
a Bill in 1966 proposing that only 11 companies 
should be permitted to deal with the business of 
Third Party. Accusations were made in Parliament 
that the Minister had selected his political friends 
in the insurance world to run his scheme. More­
over, it was alleged by Opposition M.P’s. that these 
selected insurance companies had been guaran­
teed a present of R2,000,000 of public money 
without any fear of loss. The excluded insurance 
companies lobbied intensively but without much 
general success. The Bill became law.55
The suggestion is sometimes made that the 
Government in South Africa has favoured its own 
political allies and associates on every possible 
occasion. Representative M.P's. and sponsors of 
the wool lobby actually admitted that Government 
price policy had prevented the wool farmer from 
becoming a “poor white".54 By way of gratitude 
votes were presented to the National Party. Those 
who gained diamond and fish concessions in 
South West Africa were similarly grateful.57
Evidence about South African interest groups 
suggests that what above all Is required is an 
understanding of the proper relationship between 
business (for that is where the interest groups 
are), and Government. Granted, the granite-like 
desire of South African government to resist 
encroachment upon its political aims, what, we 
may ask, can business do to deter or deflect any
unwelcome legislation?. The further question 
arises, does the political dog wave the economic 
tail? Can the Government of South Africa contain 
economic forces, or are these irresistible in the 
long run? Those who wait for a Marxist-type 
alignment of economic and political forces assume 
that the economic facts of life are making non­
sense of preconceived social ideology. The usage 
of job reservation determinations has been fre­
quently cited as an example.55
The relationship between business and govern­
ment is clearly equivocal. While Business is 
afraid that the Government will “interfere", it is 
not averse to using Government as a crutch, and 
as a concession-granting machine.59 Business is 
quite prepared to work as closely with the National­
ist Government as is necessary and desirable.40
A  government contract may make or mar a 
business concern, yet Commerce and Industry is 
prepared to live out its complicated existence in 
constant dread of government.
To what extent do interest groups constitute a 
meaningful opposition in South Africa today? 
Clearly those groups which have the ear of the 
Government are no opposition at all, and these are, 
consciously or unconsciously, allies of authority. 
A s  for the groups (from student groups to Defence 
and Aid) which, consciously or unconsciously 
find themselves in opposition, their activities are 
kept under constant surveillance. Yet what must 
constantly surprise the outside observer is the 
manner in which potential opposition groups fail 
to form in spite of the strength of the convictions 
of their advocates. What indeed is surprising 
about South African life is its lack of spontaneity. 
In the field of popular entertainment, it is truly 
remarkable to note the way in which young people 
accept restrictions. Quarters close to the govern­
ment maintain a constant hostility to certain 
modern styles of popular entertainment, particu­
larly when these are associated with supposedly 
degenerate outside influence. The Beatles, as a 
popular singing group, were banned from the air 
on account of a supposed remark by one of their 
nu,. jer which was taken to be blasphemous. Their 
music has not been heard since 1965. Again, great 
hostility has been shown towards the modern 
trend to folk-singing, on account of its association 
with the American Civil Rights movement. While 
there is no lack of popular music heard on the 
S.A.B.C., one has the impression that the govern-
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ment will strike (sometimes logically, sometimes 
not) at any agency which it feels to be inimical to
its interests. The Government counter presses the 
pressure group.
NOTES
1. An examination of the syllabuses for political science in the various universities of the Republic shows that, of seven 
universities which offered the subject in 1963, not one required a knowledge of political behaviour, and all required 
some coverage of political philosophy, usually with a historical bias.
2. S.A. 428 (A.D.) Harris versus Minister of Interior (1952). See R. Kilpin, Parliamentary Procedure in South Africa 3rd 
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capitals.” Parties and Politics in America (Cornell) 1960, p. 21.
6. An interesting exception to this is a short piece by E. G. Brookes under “Parties" in the Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 
where an attempt is made to link up social and historical forces with party alignments in South Africa up to 1933.
7. The Official Natal Guide, 1963 edition, p. 177.
8. ibid, p.177.
9. S. E  Finer Anonymous Empire. Second edition, 1962, p. 76, who abstracted the term from the Financial Times, 29th 
April, 1957.
10. See Hansard, 3rd June, 1963 (Assembly), cols. 7109-12 for details of registered unions.
See also D. Hobart Houghton, The South African Economy, p. 147 for an explanation of the relevant legislation.
11. Opponents of job reservation include the Progressive and Liberal parties, as well as the more obvious interest groups 
(the non-European trade unions (South African Congress of Trade Unions)). The Association of Chambers of 
Commerce, opposes the policy of job reservation on economic grounds. A  particular industry’s  problems in this 
regard are very clearly set out in the Memorandum to the Commissioner of Enquiry into the Hotel Industry (1963) 
Part I, paras. 20-35.
12. For example, how far would a “confidential" pressure group cause particular types of legislation to be enacted.
13. See H. Laski, Studies in Law and Politics (1924), and Sir Ivor Jennings, Party Politics, Vol. III. A  thorough survey is 
W. L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite (1960) and also in H. Thomas (ed.) The Establishment (1959).
14. R. Michels Political Parties (ed. S. M. Upset, 1962), passim, and the critique by C. W. Cassinelli in American Political 
Science Review XLVII, pp. 773-84.
15. On societies de pensee see M. Duverger, Political Parties (1954), p. 149, and on the Radicals see F. de Tarr, The 
Radical Party passim.
16. Duverger, op. cit., p. 149.
17. One cause celebre involved a European man, injured in an accident who was taken to a non-European hospital (King 
Edward VIII Hospital in Durban). One European lady wrote personally to the Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd, protesting 
against this transgression of the principles of apartheid.
18. For the distinction between an Establishment and a Power Elite, see Jean Blondel, Voters, Parties and Leaders (1963) 
chapter 9, and see C. Wright Mills, The Power Elite (1957), p. 277. See also A. Sampson Anatomy of Britain (1961), and 
B. Inglis, Private Conscience— Public Morality (1964).
19. Clarendon public schools are the nine schools— Eton, Rugby, Winchester, Westminster, Charterhouse, Merchant 
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1864. See Blondel, op. cit., p. 40. The "public schools” in South Africa are, inter alia, Michaelhouse, Hilton in Natal, 
Bishops in the Cape.
20. R. M. Mclver, The Web of Government (1947), pp. 107-8.
21. Truman, op. cit., p. 189, quoting W. O. Jenkins: “A  Review of Leadership Studies with Particular Reference to Military 
Problems", Psychological Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January 1947), p.p 74-5,
22. Cecil A. Gibb "The Principles and Traits of Leadership" Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, Vol. 42, No. 3
(1947), p. 284. dm:.
23. A  short account of de Gaulle’s conflict with pressure groups may be seen in D. Thomson’s France since Evian, 
reproduced in The World Today, Vol. 20, No. 5 (1964), particularly the remark “The Gauilist State still has a considerable 
way to go before the President's authority is asserted over the sectional interests which he claims to override." 
op.-cit., p. 195.
24. The greatest problem for interest group theorists has been to find a universally acceptable theory which will take 
account of and allow for the collection of data. A s  each new case-study is made, the process of theorising becomes 
more difficult. Nevertheless, it must be made, in order to give coherence to case-studies.
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25. Blondel, op, cit., pp. 14-16 and pp. 160-1. H. Finer in Anonymous Empire, p. 112 and also the latter’s  article The Lobbies 
in The Twentieth Century, October 1957 (Vol. 162, No. 968), p. 372, where he defines the term 'Lobby' "generically" 
.. . "it means all associations in so far as they go In for influencing public bodies”, but yet distinguishes between the 
two sorts, those which “promote" and those which "protect". A . Potter, Organised Groups in British National Politics 
(1960) distinguishes similarly between Spokesman Groups and Promotional Groups.
26. Hansard, Col. 6674, 27th May, 1963.
27. Finer, op. cit., p. 37.
28. S. M. Lipset, Political Men, Chapter XIII, The End of Ideology?
29. W. C. Runciman, Sociological Evidence and Political Theory in Philosophy, Politics and Society (Second Series 1962) 
p. 36, ed. P. Lasfett and W. G. Runciman.
30. Finer, Anonymous Empire, p. 40.
31. op. cit., p. 44.
32. R. S. Downie, Government Action and Morality (1964), p. 64 has a footnote in which the author confesses that he 
regarded government as an "impartial arbiter" but was persuaded to the viewpoint quoted by discussion with Profes­
sor Graeme Moodie of G lasgow  University.
33. The essential requirement for a two or more party state is that there should be a pendulum permitting a swing from 
one party to another and that it should swing. See J. P. McIntosh, The British Cabinet (1960) and an article in The 
Statist, June 14th, 1963, by William Pickles. It might be said that South Africa is becoming a "voluntary" one-party 
state because there is no sign of that essential feature of two-party government, viz. that there should be a pendulum 
and that it should swing, albeit slowly.
34. The concept of access, now firmly established in political behaviour analysis has been defined by Truman, op, cit., 
p. 264, as “the facilitating intermediate objective of political interest groups”.
The concept of access involves the notion that a complaint is not effective unless the person capable of remedying 
(or assisting in the remedying of) the complaint is accessible.
35. Examples are the portfolios of Posts and Telegraphs and Health of Bantu Education and Indian Affairs (as distin­
guished from Bantu Administration and Development). A lso  bracketed together are Coloured Affairs, Community 
Development and Housing.
36. He was the Deputy Minister of the Interior, of Education, of Arts and Science, of Labour and Immigration.
37. G. Carter, The Politics of Inequality, p. 171. The Chamber of Mines has, however, never been successful in breaking 
the industrial colour bar.
See The Political Economy of South Africa (1967), p. 7.
38. South Africa is not a participant in the Olympic Games.
39. See Hansard (House of Assembly) Question X I Government Policy Against T.V., Column 17,19th January, 1960.
40. Dr. Verwoerd as Prime Minister, assessed these points in Parliament on 9th March, 1960.
41. In January 1966, the author interviewed the United Party M.P. for Orange Grove who has taken a particular interest in 
the question of television, and who said that the trouble was that there was, in South Africa, no television "lobby”.
42. Hansard (S.A.), Columns 5019-21,27th April, 1964.
43. Hansard (Assembly).
44. Hansard (Assembly) No. 17, Column 6517, 22nd May, 1963.
45. Some government supporters (Afrikaners as well as members of the Nationalist Party) attempted to lobby the govern­
ment regarding the institution of a national lottery and legalised gambling. They were met with by a personal rebuff 
by the last Prime Minister, Dr. Verwoerd.
46. One M.P. declared that the "  'wine lobby’ . . .  is . . .  a lobby more powerful that the oil lobby in Washington".
47. Hansard (Assembly) No. 20, Column 7533,10th-14th June, 1963. The speech was delivered in Afrikaans.
48. He also said: "It is true that it (the Bill) will rebound to their benefit. I make no apology for the fact.”
49. Hansard, op. cit., Columns 7624-95, and, in Committee, Columns 7793-7974.
50. The Annual Report South African Temperance Alliance, 1964, gives indications of the close liaison between the two 
organisations.
51. Many stories are told of the way in which railway authorities move railwaymen into strategic areas in order to tip the 
balance of votes in favour of the National Party. The railways were being used as a means of trying to solve the
• “poor white" problem, providing a safe employment for those who could have most to fear from a lowering of the 
colour bar.
52. G, Marais, Butter and Margarine, a comparative study (1967).
53. Dairy Control Act as modified in 1918, 1930 and 1950.
54. In the mid-part of 1967, the margarine companies retained the services of a firm of public relations as a prelude to 
pressing the claims of margarine amongst Ministers and M.P.s. In 1967, Professor G, Marais of Pretoria University 
produced his book op. cit. which argued the case for a removal of restrictions on the sale of margarine, mainly from 
social and economic standpoints.
55. The details may be read in Hansard (Assembly) (2) and (3) of 1966.
56. Hansard (Assembly).
57. See Newscheck, 1st July, 1966, for details of the career of one important Cabinet Minister in this connection.
58. Exception to job reservation provisions have been made in many sectors of the economy, particularly in the building 
industry.
59. The words of Lord Snow in Corridors of Power are interesting in this concept... "There are always going to be some 
government contracts. For some of our friends that carries its own simple logic.” p. 200.
60. M iss G. Carter stated that business was moreover "quite ready to work closely with the Nationalists whether with the 
Hertzog or Malanite variety.” op. cit.
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